Daf 30b
אִם כֵּן מִרְתָּח רָתַח
אִי הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי הָתִינַח אִי אָמַר לֵיהּ כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ פְּרָטָא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת אֶלָּא אִי אָמַר לֵיהּ כְּלָלָא אַכַּתִּי כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ
סְבַר אִיבְעֵי מִינֵּיהּ חֲדָא דְּשָׁמַעְנָא תַּרְתֵּי דְּאִי בָּעֵינָא כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת הָא נִיחָא אִי אָמַר לִי כְּלָלָא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ אֶלָּא אִי אָמַר לִי פְּרָטָא אַכַּתִּי כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי
וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת
וְהֵי אַתְנְיֵיהּ אִילֵּימָא כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת אַתְנְיֵיהּ הַאי לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא אֶלָּא כְּזַיִת כְּזַיִת אַתְנְיֵיהּ
לְדִידֵיהּ דְּלָא אַתְנִיתֵיהּ אֶלָּא חֲדָא וְשַׁמְעִינְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּקָא גָרְסִי תַּרְתֵּי וְסָבַר דִּידִי דַּוְוקָא וְדִידְהוּ עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי אוֹ דִלְמָא דִּידְהוּ דַּוְוקָא וּלְדִידִי שַׁיּוֹרֵי שַׁיַּיר לִי וּמִדְּשַׁיַּיר לִי לְדִידִי הָא שַׁיַּיר לְהוּ לְדִידְהוּ נָמֵי בְּהָךְ
אֲמַר לֵיהּ הוּא שָׁאַל בִּי דְּבַר חָכְמָה וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ לְדִידָךְ דְּאַתְנִיתָךְ תַּרְתֵּי לָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כִּי מַגְּעַתְּ לְהוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי לָא פְּלִיגִי
אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּרַבִּי לֹא מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ הִיא לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר כְּזַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָּרֵת הָא אִידַּךְ עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי
תָּא שְׁמַע דִּבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ לֵוִי מֵרַבִּי חִישֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ מַהוּ אָמַר לוֹ זוֹ שְׁאֵילָה עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי
כְּזַיִת כְּזַיִת תְּנַן אֲבָל כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי אוֹ דִלְמָא כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת תְּנַן דִּלְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה פְּרָטָא הָוֵי וְכָל שֶׁכֵּן כְּזַיִת כְּזַיִת
אָמַר עוּלָּא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא אֶפְשָׁר יָדְעִין חַבְרִין בַּבְלָאֵה כְּזַיִת כְּזַיִת תְּנַן אוֹ כְּזַיִת וּכְזַיִת תְּנַן
אֲמַר לֵיהּ הוּא אָמַר לָא פְּלִיגִי וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא פְּלִיגִי
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אִי אֲמַר תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים הֲוָה אָמֵינָא פַּלְגָא תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּפַלְגָא תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים לְהָכִי אֲמַר תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים לְמֵימְרָא דְּכוּלַּהּ עוֹלָה וְכוּלַּהּ שְׁלָמִים הָוְיָא
כִּי פְּלִיגִי דְּאָמַר תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר מִדַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵימַר תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים וַאֲמַר תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ
דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַכֹּל מוֹדִים הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר תָּחוּל זוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ (אָמַר) תָּחוּל זוֹ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל לָא חָיְילָא לֹא תָּחוּל זוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חָלָה זוֹ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חָיְילָא
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי אֲמַר לֵיהּ פְּלִיגִי בְּמַאי דִּפְלִיגִי וְלָא פְּלִיגִי בְּמַאי דְּלָא פְּלִיגִי
Said Abaye to him: Yet surely Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in R. Johanan's name: When you bring R. Meir and R. Jose together, [you find that] they do not disagree. (1) But do they not disagree? Surely they do disagree? — They disagree in what they disagree, he answered him, and they do not disagree in what they do not disagree. (2) For R. Isaac b. Joseph said in R. Johanan's name: All agree that if he declared ‘Let this [sanctity] fall upon the animal and after that let that [sanctity] fall upon it,’ [the latter] does not fall upon it. (3) ‘Let this [sanctity] not fall upon it unless the other falls upon it [too],’ all agree that [the latter] does not fall upon it. (4) They disagree only where he declares, ‘[Let this animal be] a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering.’ R. Meir holds: Since he should have said, ‘A substitute for a burntoffering and a peace-offering.’ (5) but said [instead], ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering,’ you may infer that he has indeed retracted. (6) And R. Jose? (7) — Had he declared, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offering,’ I might have interpreted it, Half as a substitute for a burnt-offering and half as a substitute for a peace-offering; (8) therefore he declared, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ to intimate that the whole should be a burnt-offering and the whole should be a peace-offerings! (9) — Said he [R. Dimi] to him [Abaye]: He [Rabbah b. Bar Hanah] said that they do not disagree, but I maintain that they do disagree. (10) ‘Ulla-others state, R. Oshaia — said: Perhaps our Babylonian colleagues know whether we learnt, ‘As much as an olive... as much as an olive’; or did we learn, ‘As much as an olive... and as much as an olive’? (11) [The point of the question is this:] Did we learn, ‘As much as an olive... as much as an olive,’ (12) but [if he declared,] ‘. . . As much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ all agree that it constitutes a mingling of intentions. (13) Or perhaps we learnt’. . . as much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ and this, in R. Judah's opinion, constitutes a detailed enumeration, (14) and all the more [if he declared]’. . . as much as an olive... as much as an olive?’ — Come and hear, for Levi asked Rabbi: What if he intended eating as much as an olive on the morrow [after time] without bounds? Said he to him: That is indeed a question: it constitutes a mingling of intentions. (15) Thereupon R. Simeon b. Rabbi observed, is this not [taught in] our Mishnah: [IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW; [OR] AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW, AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT;’ [OR] HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW; [OR] HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW. HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT: IT IS INVALID, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. Hence it follows that the other case (16) constitutes a mingling of intentions. (17) Nevertheless he asked me a profound question, he replied, though you say that it is [implied in] our Mishnah. Since I taught you both [cases], you find no difficulty. (18) But him I taught only one, (19) while he heard that the Rabbis read both versions [in the Mishnah]. Hence his doubt: was my teaching exact, (20) whereas their [additional case] constitutes a mingling of intentions; (21) or perhaps their [version] is exact, (22) whilst I had simply omitted [one case when I taught him], and just as I had omitted this instance, so had they omitted the other instance. (23) Now, which [case] did he teach him? If we say [that] he taught him: ‘. . . as much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ [surely] that is not an omission! (24) Hence he taught him, ‘As much as an olive... as much as an olive.’ (25) Then let him ask about ‘as much as an olive... and as much as an olive’? (26) — He reasoned: I will ask him one case from which I may infer both. For if I ask about ‘as much as an olive... and as much as an olive,’ it is well if he answers me that it is a comprehensive statement, (27) then all the more is it so [in the case of] ‘as much as an olive on the morrow without’; but if he answers me that it is a detailed enumeration, then I will still have the question about ‘as much as an olive on the morrow without’. If so, [the same objection can be urged] now too: it is well if he answered him that ‘as much as an olive on the morrow without’ constitutes a detailed enumeration, then all the more is it so in the case of ‘as much as an olive and as much as an olive’. But if he answered him that it is a comprehensive statement, he would still have the question: [what about] ‘as much as an olive and as much as an olive’ ? — If so, he [Rabbi] would have shown asperity:
(1). ↑ For, as shown anon, both reject the view that only the first statement is regarded. That being so R. Meir's ruling on substitution does not agree with R. Judah in our Mishnah.
(2). ↑ They disagree only in the case cited, where their controversy is explicitly stated. But they do not disagree on the general question whether a man's first statement only is to be regarded, for they both hold that a man's complete intention must be taken into account, the point at issue being what is his intention.
(3). ↑ If he declared, ‘Let the sanctity of this animal, dedicated for a burnt-offering, fall upon this one as its substitute, and then let the sanctity of the other dedicated for a peace-offerings fall upon it’, it is not seized with the sanctity of the second, for sanctity cannot fall upon an animal which already possesses it.
(4). ↑ Since he obviously intended the animal to assume both sanctities simultaneously.
(5). ↑ If he intended both.
(6). ↑ Having declared it a substitute for the one, he retracted and made it a substitute for the other. But retraction is not permitted, and therefore it retains the first sanctity only.
(7). ↑ Does he not allow this argument?
(8). ↑ In which case it could not be sacrificed at all.
(9). ↑ Erroneously thinking that then the animal itself could be offered (presumably, as whichever sacrifice he desired, when he actually came to sacrifice it). — Thus on the present interpretation R. Meir too does not disagree with R. Jose that you cannot regard only a man's first statement, which contradicts R. Dimi.
(10). ↑ Precisely on the point whether a man's first statement only is to be regarded.
(11). ↑ In the Mishnah, did the man state, ‘I declare my intention to eat as much as an olive without bounds, as much as an olive after time’, or,... and as much as an olive after time’?
(12). ↑ R. Judah regards this as two distinct (and to some extent self-contradictory) intentions, since they are not joined by ‘and’.
(13). ↑ Hence it is not Piggul.
(14). ↑ Each is a separate statement, and there is no mingling of intentions. Hence R. Judah regards the first only.
(15). ↑ Even in R. Judah's opinion.
(16). ↑ Viz., where he declares both intentions in respect of the same piece.
(17). ↑ Why praise it then as a question worthy of asking?
(18). ↑ I taught you both versions, viz., that he declares, ‘as much as an olive... as much as an olive’; or ‘as much... and as much’, etc., and the controversy of R. Judah and the Rabbis applies to both. Hence, since the Mishnah teaches these, and not a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece, you rightly deduce that there obviously even R. Judah admits that we have a mingling of intentions.
(19). ↑ Which one is explained anon.
(20). ↑ Viz., that the controversy applies to one case only.
(21). ↑ In my opinion, so that they read this into the Mishnah incorrectly. If so, a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece certainly constitutes a mingling of intentions.
(22). ↑ The controversy applies to both.
(23). ↑ Viz., two declarations in respect of the same piece. Hence he was right to raise the question.
(24). ↑ For the case of ‘as much as an olive... as much as an olive’ follows a fortiori. If R. Judah holds that we have a detailed enumeration and no mingling of intentions even when the priest uses the copulative, how much more so when his statements are disjoined. Hence he would have understood that this too is included, but only this and no other, so that a twofold declaration in respect if the same piece would certainly be a mingling of intentions, and there would be no room for his question.
(25). ↑ Only on this assumption is there room for his question. This proves that the reading in the Mishnah is ‘as much as an olive... as much’, etc.
(26). ↑ According to the explanation above he was in doubt about that too.
(27). ↑ Sc. it is a mingling of intentions.
(1). ↑ For, as shown anon, both reject the view that only the first statement is regarded. That being so R. Meir's ruling on substitution does not agree with R. Judah in our Mishnah.
(2). ↑ They disagree only in the case cited, where their controversy is explicitly stated. But they do not disagree on the general question whether a man's first statement only is to be regarded, for they both hold that a man's complete intention must be taken into account, the point at issue being what is his intention.
(3). ↑ If he declared, ‘Let the sanctity of this animal, dedicated for a burnt-offering, fall upon this one as its substitute, and then let the sanctity of the other dedicated for a peace-offerings fall upon it’, it is not seized with the sanctity of the second, for sanctity cannot fall upon an animal which already possesses it.
(4). ↑ Since he obviously intended the animal to assume both sanctities simultaneously.
(5). ↑ If he intended both.
(6). ↑ Having declared it a substitute for the one, he retracted and made it a substitute for the other. But retraction is not permitted, and therefore it retains the first sanctity only.
(7). ↑ Does he not allow this argument?
(8). ↑ In which case it could not be sacrificed at all.
(9). ↑ Erroneously thinking that then the animal itself could be offered (presumably, as whichever sacrifice he desired, when he actually came to sacrifice it). — Thus on the present interpretation R. Meir too does not disagree with R. Jose that you cannot regard only a man's first statement, which contradicts R. Dimi.
(10). ↑ Precisely on the point whether a man's first statement only is to be regarded.
(11). ↑ In the Mishnah, did the man state, ‘I declare my intention to eat as much as an olive without bounds, as much as an olive after time’, or,... and as much as an olive after time’?
(12). ↑ R. Judah regards this as two distinct (and to some extent self-contradictory) intentions, since they are not joined by ‘and’.
(13). ↑ Hence it is not Piggul.
(14). ↑ Each is a separate statement, and there is no mingling of intentions. Hence R. Judah regards the first only.
(15). ↑ Even in R. Judah's opinion.
(16). ↑ Viz., where he declares both intentions in respect of the same piece.
(17). ↑ Why praise it then as a question worthy of asking?
(18). ↑ I taught you both versions, viz., that he declares, ‘as much as an olive... as much as an olive’; or ‘as much... and as much’, etc., and the controversy of R. Judah and the Rabbis applies to both. Hence, since the Mishnah teaches these, and not a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece, you rightly deduce that there obviously even R. Judah admits that we have a mingling of intentions.
(19). ↑ Which one is explained anon.
(20). ↑ Viz., that the controversy applies to one case only.
(21). ↑ In my opinion, so that they read this into the Mishnah incorrectly. If so, a twofold declaration in respect of the same piece certainly constitutes a mingling of intentions.
(22). ↑ The controversy applies to both.
(23). ↑ Viz., two declarations in respect of the same piece. Hence he was right to raise the question.
(24). ↑ For the case of ‘as much as an olive... as much as an olive’ follows a fortiori. If R. Judah holds that we have a detailed enumeration and no mingling of intentions even when the priest uses the copulative, how much more so when his statements are disjoined. Hence he would have understood that this too is included, but only this and no other, so that a twofold declaration in respect if the same piece would certainly be a mingling of intentions, and there would be no room for his question.
(25). ↑ Only on this assumption is there room for his question. This proves that the reading in the Mishnah is ‘as much as an olive... as much’, etc.
(26). ↑ According to the explanation above he was in doubt about that too.
(27). ↑ Sc. it is a mingling of intentions.
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